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SHOULD PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERTS EVER
BE PRIVILEGED PERSONS?1
Deniza Gertsberg*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the media fixation with pursuing crime
stories has made it increasingly difficult for persons accused of a
crime to enjoy a fair judicial process.2 The media's concentration
on trials to increase ratings and profits delivers what the voyeuris-
tic public wants to see: raw human emotion discharged through
greed, sex, and murder.3 It is no longer true that any publicity is
good publicity.' Witness the trials of O.J. Simpson and Martha
Stewart.' Their celebrity status granted them the misfortune of
having to face two trials-the legal trial and the trial by the court
of public opinion.6 Even defendants with no prior celebrity status
often become infamous overnight when accused of a crime.7 Me-
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2005; B.A. Fordham
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1. In this Comment, public relations firms, public relations consultants, and
public relations experts are used interchangeablely without implying any doctrinal
difference.
2. Elisabeth Semel & Charles M. Sevilla, Talk to the Media About Your Client?
Think Again, 21 CHAMPION 10, 11 (1997).
3. Id. at 10; see Carol Ann Kell, Putting Your Client Out Front, N.J. L.J., June 16,
1997, at 31 ("[T]he reality is that what is communicated in the media is often per-
ceived by the public as gospel.").
4. See, e.g., Vanessa Blum, Waging War in the Court of Public Opinion, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1999, at 15.
5. See Robert W. Tracinski, Martha and the Tall Poppies, CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 12,
2004, at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewCommentary.asp?Page=\Commentary\archive\
200401\COM20040112a.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004) ("As the Martha Stewart case
finally goes to trial, it is clear that Ms. Stewart has already been convicted in the court
of public opinion.").
6. See George Brewer, The Trial of O.J. Lipstadt, REVIsIONIST, 2001, available at
http://www.vho.org/tr/2001/2/tr06ojlipstadt.html; Peter Henderson & Lauren Weber,
Kobe's Sponsors Await Trial of Public Opinion, REUTERS, July 19, 2003, available at
http://www.uktoplOO.reuters.comlatest/mcdonalds/topl0/20030719-bryant-marketing.
asp ("In the court of law, he is innocent until proven guilty. When a district attorney
presses charges, he is guilty until proven innocent in the court of public opinion.").
7. See Mawiyah Hooker & Elizabeth Lange, Limiting Extrajudicial Speech in
High-Profile Cases: The Duty of the Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Their Pre-
Trial Communications with the Media, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 655, 666-67 (2003)
("The characterization [of Steven J. Hatfill, the suspected anthrax mailer] as a 'person
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dia has "enormous power" to influence the course of legal pro-
ceedings.8 The result for clients whose lawyers are not trained in
public relations could be devastating.9
This phenomenon' ° broadens an attorney's role." Not only is a
lawyer obligated to pursue lawful strategies in the court of law, but
a lawyer must also ensure that the client's right to a fair trial is not
undermined by negative media campaigns that ignite public out-
rage, induces prosecutors to bring more severe charges, and possi-
bly influence the jury pool.12 Yet, lawyers are taught how to
litigate, negotiate, and practice law according to precedent. They
are not taught how to "spin."13 Untrained and unskilled in ad-
of interest' must have had some negative effect on the public because this once promi-
nent professional has lost one job and has been suspended from another.").
8. See JAMES F. HAGGERTY, IN THE COURT OF PUBLIC OPINION: WINNING YOUR
CASE WITH PUBLIC RELATIONS 5 (2003).
9. See Tracinski, supra note 5.
10. The media feeding frenzy is a "phenomenon" only in the sense that the availa-
bility of sources that deliver the "news" has increased exponentially. See Christine
Brennan, Hubbub Surrounding Bryant Case Hits Ridiculous Heights, USA TODAY,
Aug. 7, 2003, at C9; available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/columnist/brennan/
2003-08-06-brennanx.htm ("There are hundreds of cable outlets, thousands of radio
shows, hundreds of thousands of Web sites and chat rooms-and they all have oodles
of airtime and space to fill."); see generally David Harris, The Appearance of Justice:
Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of the Criminal Justice
System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1993) (arguing that although most people get their
information about the criminal justice system through the media, the information is
often misleading and frequently wrong).
11. The negative influence of publicity on the outcome of litigation is not a new
phenomenon in American history. See Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who is an
Impartial Juror in an Age of Mass Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 635-36 (1991)
("'Not a Term passes without this Court being importuned to review convictions, had
in States throughout the country, in which substantial claims are made that a jury trial
has been distorted because of inflammatory newspaper accounts"') (quoting Irwin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Jonathan M. Moses,
Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1811, 1816 (1995) (discussing Aaron Burr's highly publicized trial and his
ability to get a fair trial where newspapers had published affidavits of two prosecution
witnesses). Minow and Cate also discuss the increased number of cable channels
dedicated to dissecting high-profile cases. Minow & Cate, supra, at 635.
12. Joseph W. Martini & Charles F. Wilson, These Days Spin Is In: Defending
Your Client in the Court of Public Opinion, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 1, 2003, at 5; see Erin
McClam, Stewart Judge Begins Questioning Jurors, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 22, 2004,
at http://www.rednova.com/news/stories/6/2004/01/22/story147.html (last visited Nov.
2, 2004) (discussing the difficulty the judge faced in the Martha Stewart trial when
selecting an impartial jury who could be "fair despite the heavy pretrial publicity").
13. The term "spin control" originated in the halls of politics to describe how poli-
ticians and their spokespeople coordinate and manipulate commentary for purposes
of controlling public opinion. See JOHN A. MALTESE, SPIN CONTROL: THE WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL
NEWS 23 (2d ed. rev. 1994); see also David Levy et al., Have a Media Plan Before
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dressing the media, many lawyers require "outside help ' 14 from
public relations firms when representing clients who endure highly
publicized trials. A public relations consultant or firm can help at-
torneys understand the effects of publicity on the judicial proceed-
ing.15 The attorney can thus respond with an appropriate legal
strategy that attempts to minimize the negative effects of
publicity. 6
Lawyers cannot be sure that confidential information and com-
munications exchanged with a public relations firm will be pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege.'" This uncertainty injures
clients because they are less likely to be frank with attorneys if
attorney-client privilege applies only some of the time.'" A lawyer
who does not know the full facts cannot represent her client using
her fullest efforts.' 9
Traditionally, disclosure of confidential information to a third
party was viewed as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.2"
Crisis Strikes, NAT'L L. J., Aug. 19, 2002, at C13 ("There are only two guys in every
media saga--a good guy and a bad guy.... Without the proper insight and training,
the lawyer loses control.").
14. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 64 (stating that "because attorneys are
trained for the courtroom, not the press conference, mistakes are likely even if one is
prepared"); see also Harris, supra note 10, at 785 (describing that while "[tielevision
ensures that jurors are empanelled with ridiculous expectations," the lawyers are
"blind to anything but the intricacies of procedure"). The term "outside help" is from
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
15. See HAGGERTY, supra note 8, at 6-7.
16. Id.
17. Cases described in this Comment with similar facts addressing privilege being
extended to public releations firms, result in diverse holdings. Compare Calvin Klein
Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining to extend the
privilege to information sought from a public relations firm), and Haugh v. Schroder,
Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,
2003) (holding that the privilege does not protect communications with a public rela-
tions consultant), with In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp.
2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (extending the attorney-client privildge to some, but not all,
communications between the client, the lawyers, and the public relations firm).
18. See infra Part I.A.3.
19. See id.
20. See Goddard v. Gardner, 28 Conn. 172, 175 (1859) (finding that when a third
party is present at communication between attorney and client, the communication is
not covered by the privilege); Springer v. Byram, 36 N.E. 361, 363 (Ind. 1894) ("It is
settled law that if parties sustaining confidential relations to each other hold their
conversation in the presence and hearing of third persons, whether they be necessarily
present as officers, or indifferent bystanders, such third persons are not prohibited
from testifying to what they heard."); Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394, 401 (1880) ("It
may be that if a client chooses to speak his mind to his counsel, in the presence and
hearing of persons unrelated to him in the matter, that what is said is not
privileged.").
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There is an exception, however, for third parties who have a neces-
sary role in assisting the lawyer as a consulting expert or an agent.2'
This Comment addresses the issue of whether, and under what cir-
cumstances, a lawyer's communications with a public relations ex-
pert, whose advice and assistance is only valuable to the extent that
it is communicated fully and freely with the attorney, will be pro-
tected by privilege. This Comment focuses on the role of public
relations firms in the criminal law context, where constitutional
concerns often arise.
Part I of the Comment explores the boundaries of the attorney-
client privilege and explores how the privilege developed through
the years.22 Part II examines the traditionally limited view of a
lawyer's role and indicates how the advent of mass media has
forced the defense lawyer to do more than litigate in the court of
law.23 Part III examines cases involving public relations firms and
the attorney-client privilege. 24 The section explores such issues as
whether a public relations firm may be considered a privileged per-
son because it plays a significant enough role in assisting the attor-
ney in representing her client. Resolving these issues involves
determining (1) what courts consider legitimate legal services, as
opposed to business services, and (2) whether the public relations
expert, as a third party, gives sufficiently important assistance to
the lawyer in rendering legal services, as opposed to (a) not giving
assistance that is really needed; (b) assisting the lawyer in non-legal
services; or (c) giving assistance to the client and not the lawyer.26
Part IV scrutinizes the cases discussed in Part III and suggests that
the decision reached by the Stewart court is more rational and con-
sistent with modern legal practice.27 The Comment also argues
that in cases where the public relations firm acts as a consulting
expert to an attorney representing a highly publicized criminal de-
fendant, the firm should be considered a privileged person for the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege.28 Finally, this Comment
21. In re Hill, 786 F.2d 3, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (paralegal); United States v. Pipkins,
528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (handwriting analyst)); Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client
Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE L.J.
853, 874-75 (1998) (citing United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1975) (inves-
tigator) [hereinafter Rice, Eroding Concept].
22. See infra notes 30-113 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 114-68 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 169-225 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 170-94 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 169-225 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
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concludes that in order to maintain fairness in the judicial process
for those accused of a crime, our system of adjudication must rec-
ognize that, in certain circumstances, the assistance of public rela-
tions firms will be required, and the attorney-client privilege must
not be denied.2 9
I. BACKGROUND
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
Attorney-client privilege is the oldest rule of privilege known to
common law.3° It evolved from a tradition of the English courts
where the privilege belonged to the lawyer and was grounded on
humanistic considerations, enabling the attorney to "comply with
his code of honor and professional ethics. '' 31 The code of a gen-
tleman thus shielded attorneys from being compelled to testify in
court what they had been told by their clients.32 Today the privi-
lege rests with the client, and it is the client who determines
whether to assert or waive it.33
Whether embodied in the common law, state law, or federal
law34 the broad outlines of the attorney-client privilege attaches:
"(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a profes-
29. See infra notes 231-51 and accompanying text.
30. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing JACK B.
WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE §§ 503(2)-
503(d)(5)(1) (1987) and EDITH L. FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE § 517 (2d ed.
1977)); see Marjorie Cohn, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: The Eviscera-
tion of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September 11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1233, 1234-39 (2003) (explaining the historical roots of the attorney-client
privilege); Rice, supra note 21, at 868-69.
31. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d. 321, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: EVIDEN-
TIARY PRIVILEGES 108 (2002)); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS: ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
33. Id. In circumstances where the client is unable to personally assert the privi-
lege, the attorney can assert it on the client's behalf. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that the defendant
need not be present to assert the privilege).
34. FED. R. EVID. 501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
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sional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure
by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be
waived. ' 35 "The privilege must also be invoked before any disclo-
sure of the communication sought to be protected has occurred.
36
The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines
the attorney-client privilege broader than did Judge Kearse in the
above definition.37 It expands the privilege to "privileged per-
sons," not just clients and their attorneys. 31 While it is the commu-
nication that is privileged, and not the underlying facts,39 the
privilege extends to writings as well. For example, the production
of a privileged paper in possession of a person within privileged
relations cannot be compelled.40 Furthermore, there is a rebutta-
ble presumption that all communications between an attorney and
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
35. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032,
1036 (2d Cir. 1984). Another frequently quoted definition of the attorney-client privi-
lege is from Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950), which uses a more comprehensive test:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or
sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in
connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communi-
cation relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing prima-
rily either (i) an opinion of the law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or
tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client ....
36. Emily Jones, Keeping Client Confidences: Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine in Light of United States v. Adlman, 18 PACE L. REV. 419, 422
(1998).
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
38. The Restatement states that the attorney-client privilege may be invoked with
respect to "(1) a communication (2) made between privileged persons (3) in confi-
dence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the client." Id.
It further defines communications in section 69 as "any expression through which a
privileged person, as defined in § 70, undertakes to convey information to another
privileged person and any document or other record revealing such an expression."
Id. § 69. Section 70 defines "privileged person" as "the client (including a prospective
client), the client's lawyer, agents of either who facilitate communications between
them, and agents of the lawyer who facilitate the representation." Id. § 70.
39. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d at 1037 (stating that the
"attorney-client privilege protects communications rather than information").
40. J.P. Ludington, Annotation, Persons Other Than Client or Attorney Affected
By, or Included Within, Attorney-Client Privilege, 96 A.L.R. 2D 125, 127 (2004).
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client are privileged, with the burden of showing that an attorney-
client relationship exists, as well as the confidential character of
communication, resting on the party objecting to the introduction
of the evidence. 4'
1. General Constraints on the Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is a limited doctrine42 that only be-
comes "absolute" after the privilege attaches.43 First, as already
mentioned, the privilege only applies to communications not the
underlying facts.44 In addition, a conversation is not privileged au-
tomatically just because it is between a client and her attorney.45
Second, most courts agree that when an attorney functions as a
business or economic advisor, the attorney-client privilege does not
41. See, e.g., United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating
that "the party claiming the privilege carries the burden of demonstrating that: (1) the
attorney-client privilege applies; (2) the communications were protected by the privi-
lege; and (3) the privilege was not waived"); accord United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d
1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[i]n order to establish the applicability of the
attorney-client privilege to a given communication, the party asserting the privilege
must affirmatively demonstrate a non-waiver"), affd in part and vacated in part on
other grounds, 491 U.S. 554 (1989); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th
Cir. 1982) (holding that "the proponent must establish not only that an attorney-client
relationship existed, but also that the particular communications at issue are privi-
leged and that the privilege was not waived").
42. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 861 n.19 (stating that "[mjost
courts have accepted Professor Wigmore's pronouncement that because the 'benefits
[of the privilege] are all indirect and speculative [and] its obstruction is plain and
concrete... [the privilege] ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible
limits consistent with the logic of its principle.'").
43. See id. at 856 n.6 ("Under federal law and the law of most states, once the
attorney-client privilege has attached to confidential communications between the at-
torney and client, the privilege is absolute.").
44. See Alliance Constr. Solutions, Inc., v. Dep't of Corrs., 54 P.3d 861, 865 (Colo.
2002) ("[I]t is important to note that the privilege only protects against disclosure of
communications and does not protect the underlying facts on which the communica-
tion is based. In other words, 'the client may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact
within his knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his
communication to his attorney."') (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v.
Dist. Court of Denver, 718 P.2d 1044, 1049 (Colo. 1986)).
45. See United States v. Tel. & Data Sys., Inc., No. 02-C-0030-C, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15510, at *6 (W.D. Wis. July 16, 2002) (stating that "simply transmitting infor-
mation to an attorney does not cloak it in the privilege: 'a communication is not privi-
leged simply because it is made by or to a person who happens to be a lawyer"')
(quoting United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1463 (7th Cir. 1997)); Energy Capital
Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 481, 485 (2000) ("Thus, information does not be-
come privileged simply because it came from counsel, and when documents or con-
versations are created pursuant to business matters, they must be disclosed.") (citing
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 152 F.R.D. 132, 137 (N.D. Ill. 1993)).
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attach. 6 Third, the presence of third parties not privileged to the
communications that occurs between a lawyer and a client waives
the attorney-client privilege.47 Lastly, confidentiality is regarded as
a fundamental aspect of the attorney-client privilege.',
2. Attorney-Client Privilege and "Privileged Parties"
The Restatement's broader definition more accurately captures
the scope of the modern day attorney-client privilege when it de-
fines it as communications made between "privileged persons," in
confidence, for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assis-
tance for the client.49 A "client" also includes individuals who had
preliminary communications with regard to retention of counsel
but eventually decided to hire a different attorney.50 It is "univer-
sally accepted that agents of both of the attorney and the client,
who were vital to the legal assistance sought, could be brought
within the circle of confidentiality."'51 The privilege thus covers
secretaries, paralegals, and law clerks.52 It also extends to experts
46. See Energy Capital Corp., 45 Fed. Cl. at 485 (holding that the attorney-client
privilege does not protect either factual information or business advice); see also In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1037 (1984) ("the privilege is
triggered only by a client's request for legal, as contrasted with business, advice." )
(citing In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 488 (2d Cir. 1982)); Dep't of Econ. Dev. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 139 F.R.D. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "when a
lawyer acts as a business or economic advisor, there is no special relationship to give
rise to a privilege to protect his advice from disclosure") (citing Standard Chartered
Bank PLC v. Ayala Int'l Holdings (U.S.) Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 80 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
47. Evans, 113 F.3d at 1462.
48. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 859 n.12. Rice mentions that
Professor Wigmore believes that confidentiality is one of four fundamental conditions
necessary to the establishment of a privilege. Id.
The four fundamental conditions delineated by Wigmore are:
1) The communications must originate in confidence that they will not be
disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfac-
tory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the com-
munications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct
disposal of litigation.
Id.
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 68 (2002).
50. See Irvin v. Mason, 59 Pa. D. & C.4th 129, 132-33 (C.P. Ct. of Allegany County
2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Mrozek, 657 A.2d 997 (Pa. 1995)).
51. See Rice, supra note 21, at 874.
52. See United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (stating that "[gliven the complexities of modern existence few, if any, lawyers
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hired to assist with the investigation, 3 or provide scientific or tech-
nical assistance in preparation for trial.54
Despite the misgivings of some courts,55 the circle of privileged
persons has widened.5 6 The attorney-client privilege includes a cli-
ent's outside consultants hired to perform business and later re-
tained by the attorneys to assist in litigation because of their
knowledge and experience.57 It also covers consultants who are es-
sential to lawyers in performing tasks that go beyond advising a
client to the law. 58 This includes non-testifying expert witnesses,
psychiatrists, 9 accident reconstruction experts, 60 consultants that
gauge the state of public opinion for venue change purposes, and
jury consultants.6 a
could as a practical matter represent the interests of their clients without the assis-
tance of a variety of trained legal associates not yet admitted to the bar, clerks, typists,
messengers and similar aides").
53. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 906-07 (4th Cir. 1965) ("Circumstances may
exist where a lawyer finds it necessary to employ a detective to enable him adequately
to furnish legal services to his client. In such a situation the client's communication,
including those relating to the hiring of the detective, would be privileged because the
legal services are indistinguishable from the non-legal.").
54. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123 (Pa. 1995) (holding that where a
third party (accident reconstruction expert) is retained by an attorney to assist the
attorney in giving legal advice to the client, information which the attorney or the
client furnishes this third party is protected by the attorney-client privilege); Rice,
supra note 21, at 875 (describing how attorney-client privilege came to include those
"investigating or providing scientific or technical assistance in preparation for
litigation").
55. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated January 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 334
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 323 (1950)) ("The pri-
mary assumption [is] that there is a general duty to give what testimony one is capable
of giving, and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly exceptional, being so
many derogations from a positive general rule."); see also United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 710 (1974) (stating that the privilege is neither "lightly created nor expan-
sively construed"); Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir.
1991) ("This court has consistently stated that the privilege must be strictly
construed.").
56. See In re Hill, 786 F.2d 3, 6 n.4 (1st Cir. 1986) (paralegal); United States v.
Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559, 563 (5th Cir. 1976) (handwriting analyst).
57. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 875 n.61 (noting cases in the early
1990s where communications between outside consultants and attorneys were held
protected by the attorney-client privilege).
58. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 326
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that jury consultants can be covered by the privilege).
59. United States ex. rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043-46 (E.D.N.Y.
1976).
60. See Commonwealth v. Noll, 662 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. 1995).
61. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
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3. Justification for the Attorney-Client Privilege
The growing body of regulatory law which adds to the complex-
ity and specificity of legal obligations often requires that persons
untrained in the law seek professional legal assistance.62 In order
for attorneys to represent their clients competently they need to
know all the information. 63 Attorney-client privilege encourages
"full and frank communication" between attorneys and clients.'
Clients will not fear that statements made in confidence to their
attorneys will be subsequently65 subject to disclosure by an adver-
sary.66 Such full disclosure by the client allows attorneys to render
the best possible legal advice.67 Only when a client has informed
the lawyer of all the facts can a lawyer encourage "compliance with
the ever growing and increasingly complex body of public law,"
68
thus "facilitat[ing] the administration of justice. '69 Additionally,
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATTORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 68 cmt. c (2002).
63. United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Without the
attorney-client privilege, that right and many other rights belonging to those accused
of crime would in large part be rendered meaningless.").
64. UpJohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The purpose of the
privilege [is to] 'encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys."') (quot-
ing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)); see Hunt v. Blackmun, 128 U.S.
464, 470 (1888) (stating that the privilege is "founded upon the necessity, in the inter-
est and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law
and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of
when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.").
65. Davenport Group v. Strategic Inv., No. 14426-NC, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 109,
at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1995) ("If the attorney-client privilege becomes vulnerable,
the truthfulness and extent of disclosure will decrease correspondingly.").
66. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243 ("It also recognizes that a lawyer's 'assistance can
only be safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the appre-
hension of disclosure."') (quoting Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470); see Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("These privileges are rooted in the imperative need for
confidence and trust... The lawyer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate
and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representa-
tion if the professional mission is to be carried out.").
67. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see Alliance Constr. Solu-
tions, Inc. v. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 861, 864 (Colo. 2002) ("In order to provide effec-
tive legal advice, an attorney must have a full understanding of the facts underlying
the representation.") (citing Gordon v. Boyles, 9 P.3d 1106, 1123 (Colo. 2000) and
Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Dist. Court, 718 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Colo.
1986)).
68. Note, Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection in a Utilitarian World: An
Argument for Recomparison, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1697, 1699 (1995); see Schwimmer,
892 F.2d at 243 (noting that the "rule of confidentiality recognizes that sound legal
advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon
the lawyer being fully informed by the client") (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
69. Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1968) (quoting Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1963)).
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some commentators believe the attorney-client privilege may also
discourage frivolous lawsuits in cases where the attorney finds, af-
ter full disclosure, that his client's case is too weak to pursue.v
Attorney-client privilege serves an important societal interest of
effective representation to clients who disclose all the relevant in-
formation.71 The privilege also encourages an attorney to use her
fullest efforts to develop her client's case when she knows all the
facts and is confident that she will not be subsequently compelled
by her adversary to disclose her communications. 72 Thus, the privi-
lege is central to our adversarial system of justice since it assures a
client's right to a fair judicial process.7 3 The Supreme Court, for
example, has held that "[a] lawyer should be fully informed of all
the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to ob-
tain the full advantage of our legal system. 7 4
In criminal cases particularly, the privilege protects a defendant
who faces the broad power of government. 75 "[T]he right of par-
ties within our justice system to consult professional legal experts is
rendered meaningless unless communications between attorney
and client are ordinarily protected from later disclosure without cli-
ent consent. ,76 If candid communications between an attorney and
70. Michael Sweeney, Lecture at Fordham Law School (Oct. 23, 2003); see also
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91 ("The first step in the resolution of any legal problem is
ascertaining the factual background and sifting through the facts with an eye to the
legally relevant.").
71. People v. Gionis, 892 P.2d 1199, 1204-05 (Cal. 1995).
The attorney-client privilege is based on grounds of public policy and is in
furtherance of the proper and orderly functioning of our judicial system,
which necessarily depends on the confidential relationship between the at-
torney and the client. Without the ability to make full disclosure of the facts
to the attorney, the client risks inadequate representation ... by encouraging
complete disclosures, the attorney-client privilege enables the attorney to
provide suitable legal representation.
Id.
72. See Davenport Group v. Strategic Inv., No. 14426-NC, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS
109, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1995).
73. Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law Enforcement's Multi-Front
Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (And Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REv.
469, 587 (2003).
74. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
75. In re Grand Jury Proceeding Dated March 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Target, like any investigatory target or criminal defendant, is con-
fronted with the broad power of the government."); see Cole, supra note 73, at 471
(arguing that "it is fair to question some of the tactics that law enforcement officials
have been employing as they combat crime").
76. Alliance Constr. Solutions v. Dep't of Corr., 54 P.3d 861, 865 (Colo. 2002)
(citing Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 196 (Colo. 2001)); see also Cole, supra note 73,
at 587 (arguing that the attorney-client privilege "may well be the pivotal element of
the modern American lawyer's professional functions").
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her client are not protected, then the two parties to a controversy
are on unequal footing.77 In criminal cases, if clients are discour-
aged or unwilling to frankly confide in their attorney because of
uncertainty over whether their communications are protected, then
our legal system moves away from its goal of administrating
justice.78
4. Countervailing Principles
Despite being recognized as the oldest privilege in the common
law tradition and serving a useful purpose in maintaining the integ-
rity of our legal system, the attorney-client privilege has to be bal-
anced against other important societal interests.79 Judges often
have to weigh a client's right to effective, competent representation
and the public's right to evidence, the interests of society in solving
crime, and the vindication of victims' rights.80 The balancing be-
comes even more difficult in a criminal proceeding because of the
defendant's constitutional rights.81 The Second Circuit, for exam-
ple, has "severely restricted" the scope of discovery in criminal
proceedings. 82
Nevertheless, many courts adhere strongly to the "fundamental
maxim ... recognized for more than three centuries ... that the
public ... has a right to every man's evidence. ' 83 According to this
view, the attorney-client privilege is "in derogation of the search
77. See generally Alliance Constr. Solutions, 54 P.3d at 864 (stating that the effec-
tiveness of legal representation depends in part on the attorney's ability to gain a full
understanding of the factual scenario underlying the representation).
78. Id. at 864-65.
79. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190
(4th Cir. 1991) ("In deciding when the privilege arose, we are mindful that the privi-
lege is 'inconsistent with the general duty to disclose and impedes the investigation of
the truth.' This court has consistently held that the privilege must be strictly con-
strued.") (quoting United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871, 875 (4th Cir. 1984)).
80. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated January 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. 332, 334
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1974), for the posi-
tion that "the 'fundamental maxim' recognized for more than three centuries ... [is]
that the public ... has the right to every man's evidence").
81. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) ("The interests of society and
the accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or
innocence demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and
presentation of each side of the case.").
82. United States v. Dessange Inc., No. S2 99 CR. 1182, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3734, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2000).
83. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated January 20, 1998, 995 F. Supp. at 334 (citing
Bryan, 339 U.S. at 331).
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for the truth. '8 4 Holding the public's right to evidence on a higher
plane, some judges rule that the privilege "should be narrowly con-
strued."8 Typically, the decisions reflect a view that the privilege
is seen as a barrier to learning the truth.86 Judges that subscribe to
such a view often protect only those communications that are be-
tween a client and her lawyer.8 7
Another reason for a strict interpretation of the attorney-client
privilege is a fear that extending the privilege will invite abuse.
The fear is grounded in concrete examples that recently shocked
the country, from tobacco litigation to Enron, where, at least in the
tobacco case, the attorney-client privilege was used for fraudulent
purposes.88 For example, the tobacco companies had potentially
damaging studies and scientific experiments conducted through le-
gal counsel so they could be suppressed if they ultimately proved
unfavorable to the companies' interests. Compounding the prob-
lem was the companies' public avowal that the products were safe
and that all such studies and experiments were conducted by im-
partial scientists and would be fully disclosed, regardless of the
outcome.89
Retrospectively, there is no doubt that the attorney-client privi-
lege was abused when attorneys were used to cover up damaging
studies.90 Determining whether an abuse of the privilege has taken
84. United States v. Tele. & Data Sys., Inc., No. 02-C-0030-C, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15510, at *5 (W.D. Wis. July 16, 2002).
85. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am. Inc., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14586, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (citing United States v. Weissman, 195
F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1999)).
86. Cyril V. Smith, Attorney-Client Privilege Ain't What it Used To Be, BALTI-
MORE Bus. J., Dec. 2003, at 2, available at http://baltimore.bizjournals.com/baltimore/
stories/2003/12/22/focus2.html.
87. See John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to documents between the attorney
and the investigator because at the time they were created they were not intended by
the parties to be confidential); United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding no attorney-client privilege when no attorney was present when the conversa-
tion took place between the client and the client's accountant).
88. Paul R. Rice, How the Tobacco Industry Lost Its Attorney Client Privilege, LE-
GAL TIMES, May 4, 1998, at 27 [hereinafter Rice, Tobacco Industry], available at http://
www.acprivilege.com/articles/article4.html.
89. Id. Rice notes how Philip Morris "went a step further. They had their lawyers
request and supervise these communications (reports, studies, etc.) thereby using the
credibility of the attorneys to make it appear as though each communication were an
instrumental part of the legal assistance being rendered." Id.
90. Id.; see also Document: Potential Smoking Habits of 5-Year-Olds Reviewed,
Mar. 7, 1998, at http://www.cnn.com/US/9803/07/minn.tobacco/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2004) (stating that the judge in the Minnesota tobacco case found that the "tobacco
companies 'blatantly abused' attorney-client privilege").
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place is particularly difficult during the trial, however, since the in-
formation requested by challenging attorneys relates in some ways
to legal assistance. 91 While a crime/fraud exception exists to pierce
the attorney-client privilege, 92 the fact that the privilege was used
for illegal purposes reinforces the idea shared by an increasing
number of legal professionals, including those in the Department
of Justice and the SEC, that the attorney-client privilege should be
limited.93
5. Kovel and Its Progeny
The seminal case for extending attorney-client privilege to third-
party consultants was United States v. Kovel, decided by the Second
Circuit in 1961. 94 In Kovel, a former IRS agent with accounting
skills who was employed by a law firm specializing in tax law,
claimed attorney-client privilege for the work he performed in con-
nection with one of the firm's clients. 95
In Kovel, the court used a two-step process to decide that the
attorney-client privilege should be extended. First, the Kovel court
recognized that the privilege would apply in situations where a
non-English speaking client provided his confidential information
to an interpreter employed by the attorney to translate for the at-
torney.96 Second, the court concluded that since accounting con-
91. See Rice, Tobacco Industry, supra note 88, at 27.
92. Id. (explaining that "[t]he crime/fraud exception is based on the recognition
that when the client seeks the lawyer's assistance to commit a crime or fraud, whether
or not the lawyer is or becomes aware of the client's unlawful aim, the privilege serves
no useful purpose and its protection should be withdrawn").
93. See Cole, supra, note 73, at 548-49. The Justice Department's Bureau of Pris-
ons Amendments (in effect since October 31, 2001), give the Attorney General the
power, "in cases where 'reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate
may use communications with attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of
terrorism,' to order monitoring of communications between that inmate and his attor-
ney or attorney's agents." Id.
94. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
95. Id. at 919.
96. Id. at 921. The court held that there are actually four instances to which the
attorney-client privilege would apply when an attorney is dealing with a client speak-
ing a foreign language:
(1) where attorney sends a client speaking a foreign language to an inter-
preter to make a literal translation of the client's story;
(2) where the attorney employs the help of non-lawyer employee in the
room to help out;
(3) where the client brings a translator;
(4) where the attorney sends the client to a non-lawyer proficient in foreign
language, with instructions to interview the client on the attorney's behalf
and then render his own summary of the situation so that the attorney can
give the client proper legal advice.
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cepts could be as incomprehensible as a foreign language, "the
presence of an accountant ... ought not destroy the privilege.
97
The Kovel court stressed, however, that not all accountants are in-
cluded within the protection of the privilege, noting that "[w]hat is
vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confi-
dence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.""
The court's decision laid the groundwork for broadening the cat-
egory of privileged persons because it recognized that during the
course of representation, attorneys may need the assistance of con-
sultants when dealing with matters they are unskilled and un-
trained to perform.99 Yet, the Kovel decision suggested that courts
should apply a high standard before a third party will be consid-
ered "privileged" for the purposes of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 10 Indeed, the third party has to be "necessary, or at least
highly useful" to the attorney's representation of a client before
the party may be brought within the "circle of confidence.""1 1
The Kovel court recognized two categories of third parties who
could be brought into the circle of confidence. 2 The first category
includes those who are essential to the attorney, without whom
representation would be extremely difficult or impossible, as the
interpreter analogy illustrates. 10 3 Today this category encompasses
third-parties such as translators, investigators, scientific experts,
and accountants. 10 4 The second category holds agents of the attor-
ney, whose work is sufficiently important that it deserves protec-
tion, such as law clerks, assistants, and "aides of other sorts."' 0 5
This second category includes persons who may not be translating
documents for the attorney, but because of the "complexities of
Id.
97. Id. at 922.
98. Id. The presence of the accountant has to be "necessary, or at least highly
useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer . Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. "Circle of confidentiality" is a term used by Professor Rice. See Rice,
Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 874.
102. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921-22.
103. Id. at 922.
104. See Rice, Eroding Concept, supra note 21, at 874-75 n.57-58.
105. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921; see also United States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F.
Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Given the complexities of modern existence few,
if any, lawyers could as a practical matter represent the interests of their clients with-
out the assistance of a variety of trained legal associates not yet admitted to the bar,
clerks, typists, messengers, and similar aides.").
2004] 1457
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXXI
modern existence, 1 °6 they are often indispensable to the attor-
ney's ability to represent a client.'0 7
The Kovel decision and its progeny established a framework with
several overarching principles that courts use to measure the
boundaries of the privilege. First, in addition to the requirement of
confidentiality, the advice that is sought must be "legal, '1 0 8 not
business advice. Business advice would include "attorney's work in
drafting 'by-laws, promissory notes, security agreements, incorpo-
ration documents, partnership documents and tax information."" 09
Therefore, third parties who provide business advice are not con-
sidered privileged because the information is not considered "legal
advice."110
Second, the Kovel decision suggests that parties who are agents
of the client could be "privileged persons" if their presence "fur-
ther[s] the interest of the client in the consultation or those to
whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
lawyer is consulted."'1I Furthermore, the concept of the "agent"
was broadened to include outside consultants retained to perform
business services and whose knowledge and experience from that
service was important to the legal assistance later sought.1 1 2 De-
spite the expansion of the privilege in the corporate context, recent
abuses of the attorney-client privilege suggest that the attorney-cli-
ent claims of corporations will be subject to heavier scrutiny.'1 3
106. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
107. Id.
108. Energy Capital Corp. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 481, 485 (2000) ("The attor-
ney-client privilege pertains to legal advice.").
109. Id. (quoting Montgomery v. Leftwich, Moore & Douglas, 161 F.R.D. 224, 227
(D.D.C. 1995)).
110. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (holding that "if the [accounting] advice sought is the
accountant's rather than the lawyer's no privilege exists").
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE § 70 (2002).
112. See In re Bieter, 16 F.3d 929, 937 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that communications
between an independent consultant hired by the client and the client's lawyer were
protected by the attorney-client privilege where the purpose of communications were
to seek legal advice); Viacom Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 200 F.R.D. 213, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (extending the attorney-client privilege to a public relations firm hired by the
firm at the inception of litigation because the firm was considered a functional
equivalent of the company's employee).
113. See United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that
the attorney-client privilege does not apply because the required elements of the at-
torney-client privilege were not met); see also United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136,
138 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that attorney-client privilege is not extended to an invest-
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II. THE CHANGING ROLE OF A LAWYER
Justice Holmes once wrote that "[t]he theory of our system is
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influ-
ence, whether of private talk or public print. '114 As Justice
Holmes' observation indicates, the potential effect of negative
press coverage of the judicial process has long been a concern of
the judicial system.' 15 One way the judicial system dealt with the
negative publicity was to restrict the lawyer's interaction with the
press. 1
16
The American Bar Association, when it promulgated 30 Canons
of Legal Ethics in 1908, dealt with publicity about pending or antic-
ipated litigation in Canon 20.117 This Canon broadly denounced
lawyers who trafficked in litigation information by talking about
their cases in the news media.118 It provided: "Newspaper publica-
tions by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may inter-
fere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due
administration of justice. Generally, they are to be condemned."11 9
Such strong views against extrajudicial speech reflect the profes-
sion's general position that the traditional role of an attorney is in
the courtroom.120
Despite the American Bar Association's efforts to control law-
yers' communication with the press, the promulgation of Canon 20
did not stem the aggressive press coverage. History records the
highly publicized trials of Sacco and Vanzetti, 2 1 the Lindbergh kid-
ment banker who provided tax advice to an in-house counsel because the investment
banker did not function as a "translator" under the Kovel doctrine).
114. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1811 (quoting Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S.
454, 462 (1907)).
115. See, e.g., id. at 1816 (referring to the highly publicized trial of Aaron Van Burr,
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g).
116. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1819-22 (discussing attempts to control attorney
speech).
117. John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyer's Duty to Balance
News Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L. POLY. 77, 92 (2002) (explaining that the
Canons were an effort by the ABA to supplement judicial attempts at reducing
outside influences on jurors).
118. Id.
119. Donald Rotunda, Dealing With the Media: Ethical, Constitutional, and Practi-
cal Parameters, 84 ILL. B.J. 614, 615 (1996).
120. So hostile was the Canon towards lawyer communication with the press that,
even though it recognized "extreme circumstances" where a public statement could
be made, it was still antagonistic toward such extrajudicial speech. See id.
121. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1817. The murder trial shocked the world and
photos of them appeared in Boston newspapers almost immediately after their arrest.
Id.
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napper, 2 and Dr. Sheppard.123 To this day speculations about the
guilt or innocence of Sacco and Vanzetti and the defendant in the
Lindbergh case persist.124 The sensational Sheppard case, other
cases, 125 and the Warren Commission's Report, 126 encouraged the
ABA to establish its own committee to "take steps to bring about a
fair balance between the right of the public to be informed and the
right of the individual to a fair and impartial trial."'
1 27
The resulting Reardon Commission proposed Rule 1.1, which
was adopted in part by the ABA in its Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR 7-107.128 Even though six decades elapsed af-
ter the Canons were published by the ABA, the Reardon Commis-
122. Id. at 1817-18. The Lindbergh kidnapping case generated tremendous public-
ity. A well-known journalist called for the conviction and electrocution of the defen-
dant Bruno Hauptman well before the trial began. Id.
123. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). Dr. Sheppard, accused of mur-
dering his wife, petitioned the court claiming that he was denied a fair trial because
the court failed to protect him from the massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity
of his prosecution. Id. The Supreme Court reversed Dr. Sheppard's murder convic-
tion upon finding that the trial court failed to protect Sheppard from "inherently prej-
udicial publicity which saturated the community" and prejudiced the jury. Id. at 363.
124. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1818 n.31 (citing WILLIAM YOUNG & DAVID E.
KAISER, POSTMORTEM: NEW EVIDENCE IN THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 3-9
(1985) for the position that the passionate controversy over whether one or both of
defendants were framed persists); see also Bob Groves, The Case Against Lindbergh:
What if There Was No Kidnapping, RECORD (Hackensack, NJ), Apr. 18, 1993, at L1.
125. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1818. "Not a term passes without this Court be-
ing importuned to review convictions, had in States throughout the country, in which
substantial claims are made that a jury trial has been distorted because of inflam-
matory newspaper accounts." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (overturning a murder conviction in a small town based on pretrial
publicity that made it impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial).
126. See Report of the President's Commission on the Assassination of President
Kennedy, at 227 (1964) [hereinafter Warren Report], available at http://history-mat-
ters.com/archive/jfk/wc/wr/html/WCReport_0126a.htm. The Warren Commission
concluded that the media played a role in the murder of the alleged killer, Lee Har-
vey Oswald, by nightclub owner Jack Ruby. See Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030,
1067 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted the recommendation of the Warren
Commission that: "Representatives of the bar, law enforcement associations, and the
news media work together to establish ethical standards concerning the collection and
presentation of information to the public so that there will be no interference with
pending criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of individuals to a fair
trial." Id.
127. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1819 (citing ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO
FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 77 (1966)).
128. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1983). The Rule, di-
vided into three parts, controls extrajudicial speech of lawyers, by prohibiting state-
ments that a lawyer knows or reasonably should know would have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative process. Id. It gives examples of
what constitutes "likely to prejudice materially," as well as examples of permitted
statements that a lawyer may make. Id.
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sion still concentrated its efforts on attorney extrajudicial
speech.129 It failed to recognize that a lawyer, not trained in the art
of public relations, is often incapable of mitigating the negative
publicity that often adversely affects the course of a client's legal
proceedings. 130
The Commission saw lawyers as a big part of the problem and
sought to restrict lawyers' communications with the media. The
Commission believed that because "lawyers have special access to
information, including confidential statements from clients and in-
formation obtained through pretrial discovery or plea negotia-
tions ... lawyers' statements are likely to be received as especially
authoritative. ' 131 Although challenges to the Rule 132 resulted in a
somewhat more flexible 133 Model Rule 3.6, T3 the Rule was once
again modified after the Court's decision in United States v.
Gentile.135
While sensational media was limited in the past to print and tele-
vision, today its reach potential has grown exponentially. 36 The
public is flooded with images and photographs from numerous
sources that deliver the information at incredible speeds. 137 Not
only has traditional print media become more abundant, but televi-
sion networks and the Internet have expanded its reach.'
129. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1820-21.
130. Id. at 1822.
131. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1052.
132. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975) (strik-
ing down the Illinois version of DR 7-107); Watson, supra note 117, at 94 (discussing
various lawyers' associations challenging the Rule).
133. The Rule is more flexible because it has made a special provision permitting
an attorney to make extrajudicial statements. It states:
Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a rea-
sonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the sub-
stantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the
lawyer or the lawyer's client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph
shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent
adverse publicity.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6(c) (1995).
134. Id.; see also David Boyd, Form Over Substance? Fostering the Evolution of
National Standard for Attorney Conduct, SACRAMENTO LAW., Nov.-Dec., 2002, at
http://www.sacbar.org/members/saclawyer/nov.dec2002/ethics.html (last visited Nov.
2, 2004). At least 44 states have adopted Model Rules and the rest use the Rules
predecessor, the Model Code. Id.
135. See Watson, supra, note 117, at 97 ("Comments in the Annotated Model Rules
of Professional Conduct... reported that Model Rule 3.6 was 'substantially amended'
in August 10, 1994, to meet the concerns expressed in Gentile.").
136. See Minow & Cate, supra note 11, at 632, 635.
137. Id. at 633.
138. See Harris, supra note 10, at 786.
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The prosecutors and the media are intertwined where each influ-
ences the other. Objective information, such as details of a crime,
photographs of a victim or of the defendant, or even discussions
about the net worth of a celebrity figure under regulator scrutiny,
is framed to inflame the community. 139 Intense public reactions
may influence prosecutors to bring initial or heavier charges. 40 A
public saturated with every facet of the case, analyzed by legal TV
experts, may prejudice the jury pool. 41
The relationship between media, prosecutors, and the public
opinion is complex. Prosecutors influence public opinion with in-
formation they release about the crime and the defendant. 142 Pub-
lic opinion also influences prosecutors, and the prosecutors'
responses are reflected in the charges. 143 Such "media-prosecutor
alliances" usually result in the dissemination of unbalanced infor-
mation. 44 In fact, prosecutors have lied on numerous occasions to
advance the interests of their case. 45 Those accused of crime are
often not met with the fundamental presumption of innocence; in-
stead, there is a "presumption of guilt"'146 because the Justice De-
partment and law enforcement slowly gnaw away at this bedrock
principle. 47 A defense lawyer thus "gets started with the playing
field tilted negatively, with the presumption of innocence buried
under official pronouncements of guilt or castigation by the victim
and his or her family.' 148
139. Why Martha Stewart is Going to Iose Everything, "It's A Greed Thing," INB,
Dec. 3, 2002, at http://www.internetnewsbureau.com/archives/2002/decO2/marthas.
html (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
140. See Moses, supra note 11, at 1837 ("Prosecutorial discretion has been called a
lawless area and ultimately a political choice."); see also Joel Cohen & Bennett L.
Gershman, The Spin, Confidentially, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 2003, at 22 (stating that opin-
ions about O.J. Simpson may have led prosecutors to forgo seeking the death penalty;
public opinion also played a role in the re-indictment of Bernard Goetz, who was
initially not indicted for shooting at a group of young black men, but was brought
before a grand jury with no new evidence after making incendiary public statements).
141. See Minow & Cate, supra note 11, at 632.
142. See Watson, supra note 117, at 102.
143. See Cohen & Gershman, supra note 140, at 22 (noting that public opinion may
affect a prosecutor's decision to drop or reconsider a defendant's criminal charges).
144. See Watson, supra note 117, at 85.
145. See Cohen & Gershman, supra note 140, at 22 (underscoring the irony that
Martha Stewart was prosecuted and convicted for lying about a crime that she was not
even tried for, while prosecutors who have lied to advance their case go unpunished).
146. See Watson supra note 117, at 89.
147. Stephen W. Grafman, End an Ignoble Spectacle, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 11, 2003, at
31 (noting how the media circus surrounding the defendant erodes the bedrock
principle).
148. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 65.
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While the rules of Professional Responsibility caution lawyers
from contacting the media, many 'practitioners have begun to rec-
ognize that if they do not step into the spotlight and attempt to
explain the situation, their client will experience difficulty ob-
taining a fair trial and may self-incriminate by responding to media
attacks. 149 A New York jurist has noted that "[l]awyers now feel
that it is the essence of their function to try their case in the public
media." 150
In fact, the American Bar Association has begun to recognize
that the modern practice of law involves communicating with the
media.1 5 1 In August of 1994, American Bar Association amended
Model Rule 3.6.152 The Rule allows an attorney to "make a neces-
sary response to protect a client from undue prejudicial effect of
recent publicity ... 153
The ABA revisions reflect a general recognition among practi-
tioners and theorists that the adversarial relationship that serves as
a key element of the American judicial system is being expanded to
outside the courtroom. 154 The amended rule implicitly signals that
the outside forum is a proper arena where the attorney's duty to
zealously represent her clients remains paramount. 55
Some commentators suggest that in criminal cases a lawyer's at-
tempts to balance the inaccuracies of the media may gain constitu-
tional importance because the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are implicated. 156 One commentator argues that a defen-
dant has a right to a "public defense" when a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial is endangered by negative press
coverage.157 The argument is supported by the proposition that
149. See Watson, supra note 117, at 84. Avoiding the media or answering with a
"no comment" could backfire on the client creating an implication of guilt. Id. at 88.
150. Id. at 84.
151. Id. at 97.
152. See Watson, supra note 117, at 97.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 98.
155. Id.
156. See Grafman, supra note 148 (claiming that "[b]randing a person a criminal
by ... public exposure is Constitutionally offensive, a modern-day scarlet letter that
besmirches our judicial process"); Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 64 (discussing
Professor Garcia's study which indicated that the Supreme Court has failed to 1) ac-
knowledge "the connection between freedom of expression and the ideal of a fair
trial," 2) refused to place restraints on press access or reporting of courtroom pro-
ceedings in criminal cases, and 3) "not compensated for this freedom by according
more leeway to a defendant who has been .the subject of pretrial publicity").
157. See Watson, supra note 117, at 83 (quoting Max D. Stem's idea that a "defen-
dant has a right to a public defense to balance the negative consequences the defen-
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since a defendant has a First Amendment right to respond to the
charges in the news media, the defendant's attorney should be able
to exercise this right on the defendant's behalf.
158
The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Gentile v. State
Bar.159 In Gentile, the defense attorney believed that the pre-in-
dictment press coverage prejudiced the potential jury pool and thus
the outcome of the eventual trial.1 60 The attorney attempted to
mitigate the circumstances by holding a news conference on behalf
of his client.' 6' The State Bar brought disciplinary charges against
the defense attorney for violating a Nevada Supreme Court Rule
prohibiting extrajudicial speech.162 A plurality of the Court held
that an attorney has a limited First Amendment right to speak to
the media to mitigate the effects of adverse publicity. 163 The Court
overturned Gentile's disciplinary conviction and held that to be
prohibited, an attorney's extrajudicial speech must pose a "sub-
stantial likelihood of material prejudice.1 64 The court decided not
to apply the "clear and present danger" test normally applied in
First Amendment cases. 16 5
The legacy that the Gentile decision leaves behind is the plurality
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, which looks into the future.
166
Justice Kennedy recognized that an attorney's role is much broader
than litigating inside a courtroom. 167 Justice Kennedy wrote:
An attorney's duties do not begin inside the courtroom door.
He or she cannot ignore the practical implications of a legal pro-
ceeding for the client. Just as an attorney may recommend a
plea bargain or civil settlement to avoid the adverse conse-
quences of a possible loss after trial, so too an attorney may take
reasonable steps to defend a client's reputation and reduce the
adverse consequences of indictment, especially in the face of a
prosecution deemed unjust or commenced with improper mo-
dant suffers when the public and the pool of potential jurors are informed by the news
media of the arrest or indictment").
158. Id.
159. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). Doctrinally, the Supreme Court considered whether, in
order to be prohibited, extrajudicial speech by attorneys must pose a "clear and pre-
sent danger" to a judicial proceeding, a test usually applied to First Amendment is-
sues, or whether some lesser standard could apply. Id. at 1031.
160. Id. at 1042.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1033.
163. Id. at 1033-35, 1043.
164. Id. at 1063, 1074-75.
165. Id. at 1074-75.
166. Id. at 1043.
167. Id.
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tives. A defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain
dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an
attempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the
client does not deserve to be tried.1
68
III. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW
The Second Circuit recently addressed the issue of applicability
of the attorney-client privilege to public relations firms in three
cases. 169 Although all three cases had vastly different factual con-
ditions, each of them addressed whether the attorny-client privi-
lege should extend to public relations firms. The courts' reasoning
in each case were all somewhat different. The following section
will discuss the facts and the courts' holdings.
A. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003
Before being formally charged, 7 ° Martha Stewart was investi-
gated for a year and half by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in connection with her sale of ImClone stock the day before
the Food and Drug Administration announced that it would not
approve the cancer drug.17 Stewart's attorneys hired a public rela-
tion firm to balance "[the] often inaccurate press reports ... [that]
created a clear risk that the prosecutors and regulators ... would
feel public pressure to bring some kind of charge against her. 172
168. Id.
169. There is a fourth case that extends attorney-client privilege to public relations
firms. See H.W. Carter & Sons, Inc., v. Williams Carter Co., No. 95 Civ. 1274, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6578 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 1995). Aside from accepting Kovel's hold-
ing, the court engages in little analysis of its reasons for extending the attorney-client
privilege. Id.
170. Michael McMenamin, St. Martha: Why Martha Stewart Should Go to Heaven
and the SEC Should Go to Hell, REASONONLINE, Oct. 2003, at http://www.reason.com/
0310/fe.mm.st.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2004). Stewart was eventually charged with
insider trading, securities fraud, and obstruction of justice. Id. The fraud charges
were later dismissed. See Allan Chernoff, One of Martha's Charges Dismissed, CNN
Money, Feb. 27, 2004 at http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/27/news/companies/martha.
html (last visited Oct. 4, 2004).
171. See McMenamin, supra note 170. The author argues that Stewart was unfairly
singled out. Id. He calculates that Stewart saved a "mere" $45,000, compared to
others, such as CEO Sam Waksal's friends who made $600,000 and $30 million on the
sale of ImClone stock on December 27 and 28. Id. The ImClone colorectal drug,
Erbitux, later received approval from the Swiss government and the FDA. See Er-
bitux (TM) (Cetuximab) Receives FDA Approval to Treat Irinotecan Refractory or
Intolerant Metastatic Colorectal Cancer, GLOBEINVESTOR, Feb. 12, 2004, at http://
globeinvestor.com (last visited Nov. 2, 2004).
172. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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During the grand jury investigation the United States Attorney's
office subpoenaed the communications and documents from the
public relations firm. 73 It is worth noting that although the court's
entire decision supports the expansion of the attorney-client privi-
lege to public relations firms in certain circumstances, the court did
not find that in the particular case those circumstances existed.
174
Nevertheless, the court's decision takes a step into broadening the
boundaries of the Kovel doctrine.175
The court's precedent is groundbreaking in several respects.
First, the court acknowledges that the job of an attorney has broad-
ened as a result of the constant barrage of mass media surrounding
high profile clients.1 76 The court also accepts that part of a lawyer's
legitimate legal services can include defending a person in the
court of public opinion because "in some circumstances, the advo-
cacy of a client's case in the public forum will be important to the
client's ability to achieve a fair and just result in pending or
threatened litigation. ' 177 Adopting Justice Kennedy's position in
Gentile, the court endorsed the view that "lain attorney's duties do
not begin inside the courtroom door." 178
Second, the court recognized that the complex relationship that
exists between prosecutors and the media can affect the fairness of
the judicial process.179 The court acknowledged that prosecutors
are influenced by public opinion in deciding whether to bring
charges, declining to prosecute or leaving matters to civil enforce-
ment proceedings, or in deciding which particular offenses to
charge (a decision which has important consequences during the
sentencing phase of the trial).' 80 The court also noted that prose-
cutors, through the media, often engage in activities that "color
public opinion" not only to the detriment of the person's general
reputation but to her ability to obtain a fair trial.181
173. Id. at 322-23.
174. Id. at 331-32 (stating, after in camera review, that conversations Ield between
the public relations consultant and Martha Stewart were not made for the purposes of
obtaining legal advice).
175. Id. at 331.
176. Id. at 330 ("[D]ealing with the media in a high profile case probably is not a
matter for amateurs. Target and her lawyers cannot be faulted for concluding that
professional public relations advice was needed."); see also id. at 326-27 ("[T]here has
been a strong tendency to view the lawyer's role more broadly.").
177. Id. at 330.
178. Id. at 327 (citing Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991)).
179. Id. at 330.
180. Id.
181. Id. The court mentions that while prosecutors, media, and law enforcement
personnel influence public opinion, public opinion also influences prosecutors in their
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The Stewart court also recognized that many lawyers are "ama-
teurs" when dealing with high profile cases and may require the
assistance of public relations "consultants. ' 182 In fact, the court
went so far as to recognize that a lawyer's ability to perform some
of her most "fundamental client functions," such as client advising,
seeking to avoid charges, and zealously seeking acquittal or vindi-
cation, would be "undermined seriously" if lawyers could not en-
gage in a frank discussion of "facts and strategies" with the
lawyers' public relation firms.183
The Stewart court treated public relations firms as consultants
and compares their role to that of non-testifying experts or jury
consultants. 184  This brings the public relations firm closer to
Kovel's "essential category" in which the experts advise and assist
the attorney in client representation. Such characterization carves
out a niche where public relations firms could be considered privi-
leged persons. The non-testifying experts and jury consultants re-
main in the background, helping the attorney formulate legal
advice and strategies.1 85 In adopting the comparison, the court in-
voked a similar image of a public relations firm-a consultant, as-
sisting the attorney in an area in which she is not trained, in order
to formulate a legal strategy for her client.
decision making process. Id. This is perhaps the most accurate reflection on the state
of things since it is not yet clear whether it is the hungry public that drives the media
to meet the demand, or whether the media feeds public opinion with what it wants to
deliver. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 10 ("[O]ne question remains whether
the media is giving the public what the public truly wants or dictating to the public
what the media wants to sell. Perhaps there exists a more complex supply-and-de-
mand relationship.").
182. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330-31. The court specifies
that lawyers may need skilled advice as to:
[W]hether and how possible statements to the press-ranging from "no com-
ment" to detailed factual presentations-likely would be reported in order
to advise a client as to whether the making of particular statements would be
in the client's legal interest. And there simply is no practical way for such
discussions to occur with the public relations consultants if the lawyers were
not able to inform the consultants of at least some non-public facts, as well
as the lawyers' defense strategies and tactics, free of the fear that the consul-
tants could be forced to disclose those discussions.
Id.
183. Id. at 330-31.
184. See id. at 331.
185. Id. at 326 (explaining that such experts advise the attorneys "[oln matters such
as whether the state of public opinion in a community makes a change of venue desir-
able, whether jurors from particular backgrounds are likely to be disposed favorably
to the client, [and] how a client should behave while testifying in order to impress
jurors favorably").
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In expanding the Kovel doctrine, by including one more possible
category of privileged persons, the Stewart court emphasized sev-
eral requirements. First, the communications must be "confiden-
tial. ' 186 The Restatement defines confidential information as
information that the communicating person believes "no one will
learn the contents of ... except a privileged person."187 The Stew-
art court adopted this definition of confidentiality. 188
Second, the information sought from the third party must be for
the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice,1 8 9 as opposed to
"saving" a public image for a client's business purposes.
The Stewart court's third requirement emphasized that it is the
lawyer who must hire the public relations firm. 90 Had Stewart
hired the public relations firm herself, even if she had done it to
"affect her legal situation," no attorney-client privilege would have
been recognized. 191 The last requirement is somewhat at odds with
the Kovel decision. In Kovel, the court recognized that an agent or
an expert of a client could be considered a privileged person-so
long as the communication was made in confidence for the purpose
of obtaining legal advice. 192 One likely explanation for this adapta-
tion of the Kovel doctrine is that the Stewart court is attempting to
demarcate boundaries of where "legal advice" ends and "business
purposes" begin with respect to public relations consultant.
The Stewart court also did not require that an attorney be pre-
sent when communications between a client and the third party
occur, 1 93 subject to the provision that the communications be di-
rected by an attorney for the purposes of giving or obtaining legal
advice. 94
B. Calvin Klein Litigation-December 4, 2000
The attorneys for the plaintiff, Calvin Klein ("CK"), hired a pub-
lic relations firm in anticipation of a high profile civil suit filed
186. Id. at 331.
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: ATrORNEY-CLI-
ENT PRIVILEGE-"IN CONFIDENCE" § 71 (2000).
188. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
189. Id. at 331.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
193. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331. But see United States v.
Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a private meeting between a client
and an accountant following the rendering of legal advice by the client's attorney was
not subject to the protection of the privilege).
194. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
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against a licensee and its chief executive. 195 CK's lawyers argued
that the purpose of hiring the public relations consultant was de-
fensive.196 The public relations firm was primarily retained to help
the attorneys provide legal advice as well as to "assure that the
media crisis that would ensue-including responses to requests by
the media about the law suit.., would be handled responsibly.'
a97
When the defendants sought documents from the public relations
firm, CK's attorneys invoked the attorney-client privilege to block
communication and document production.198
The court rejected all of plaintiff's arguments that recognized the
public relations firm as a privileged person. 199 Not swayed by the
plaintiff's "vague and largely rhetorical contentions," the court re-
jected the arguments on three grounds.2 °° First, the court found
that "few, if any, of the documents at issue appear to contain or
reveal confidential communications from the . . . client. ' 20 1 Sec-
ond, the court found that the public relations firm was not assisting
the attorneys in developing legal strategies or rendering advice.20 2
One possible explanation for this conclusion is that the court was
unconvinced that a public relations firm with a preexisting relation-
ship with the client was hired to do anything else than help to
maintain a good public image for the client's business.20 3 Third, the
court held that the privilege must be narrowly construed2 0 4 and not
be expanded to public relations firms whose activities may "also"
have been helpful to the client's attorneys.20 5
There are several possible interpretations of the case. One view
is that the facts in the case did not support the extension of the
attorney-client privilege. The plaintiff's pre-existing relationship
with the public relations firm makes it difficult to determine
195. Calving Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 54-55.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 54.
202. Id. at 54-55 (noting that the public relations firm gave "ordinary public rela-
tions advice").
203. See id. at 54.
204. Id.
205. Id. Note that the court's use of the word "also" strongly suggests that it
viewed the role of the public relations firm predominantly to improve/save the client's
business reputation, thereby failing to qualify for attorney-client privilege protection.
Id. The court found that "the privilege protects communications between a client and
an attorney, not communications that prove important to an attorney's legal advice to
a client." Id. (quoting United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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whether the public relations firm was indeed assisting the attorneys
in the rendition of legal services or whether the public relations
firm functioned primarily for the client's business purposes.20 6 For
example, the CK court was skeptical of the role that the public
relations firm played in the litigation. 0 7
The facts suggest that the court may never view a public relations
firm as a privileged person. 0 The CK court applied Kovel's
"translator" analogy, but found that the public relations firm did
not "translate" any document. 20 9 Furthermore, the court found
that
nothing in the policy of the privilege suggests that attorneys,
simply by placing accountants, scientists, or investigators [or,
here, a public relations firm] on their payrolls... should be able
to invest all communications by clients to such persons with a
privilege the law has not seen fit to extend when the [third party
is] operating under their own steam. 10
The court thus concluded that the public relations firm provided
"ordinary public relations advice. "211 This view suggests that the
court does not recognize the possibility that a public relations firm
could assist an attorney in the representation of a client. The CK
court, therefore, declined to extend the protection of attorney-cli-
ent privilege to public relations firms. 21 2
C. Haugh v. Schroder Investment Management
North America, Ina
In Schroder, an employment age discrimination case, the plain-
tiff's attorney hired a public relations consultant in a suit against
the employer alleging unlawful age discrimination. 3 The defend-
ants sought certain communications and documents, 14 including
fifteen e-mails exchanged between the consultant and the client, as
206. Id. at 54.
207. Id. at 54-55. The court concluded that the public relations firm's activities,
such as "reviewing press coverage, making calls to various media to comment on de-
velopments in the litigation and even 'finding friendly reporters,"' cannot be consid-
ered sufficiently important to be brought within the circle of confidence. Id.
208. Id. at 54.
209. Id.
210. Id. (quoting United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961)) (altera-
tion in orginal).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14586, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
214. Id. at *1.
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well as the a sixteenth e-mail, which was communicated between
the consultant and the client's attorney.215 The plaintiff asserted
attorney-client privilege, claiming that the public relations consult-
ant provided advice and assistance that enabled the attorney to
render legal services.216
The Schroder court did not find that the consultant performed
anything other than "standard" public relations services for the
plaintiff, and thus declined to extend the attorney-client privi-
lege.217 The court also claimed to have followed the principle
enunciated in Calvin Klein. The court's analysis, however, reveals
that it relied more on the reasoning and analysis of Judge Kaplan's
decision in the Martha Stewart case, than on the Calvin Klein
decision. 8
The Schroder court specifically stated that it did not decline to
follow the Martha Stewart decision, noting that there was no need
to determine whether In re Grand Jury Subpoenas was decided
correctly.21 9 Second, the court expressly stated that the case before
it was decided on its facts-suggesting that under different circum-
stances the outcome may have been different.
220
Third, the Schroder court relied on Judge Kaplan's terminology
in In re Grand Jury Subpoena221 to find that the plaintiff did not
show any "nexus" between the consultant's work and the attor-
ney's role in preparing the plaintiff's complaint or the plaintiff's
case.222 Fourth, factually the Schroeder case is closer to Martha
Stewart's grand jury case than to the CK case. Just as in Martha
Stewart's grand jury case, the Schroder case involved communica-
tions that were predominantly transmitted between the plaintiff
and the public relations consultant. Likewise, just as Judge Kaplan
found that there was no showing that established the nexus suffi-
ciently close to the provision or receipt of legal advice,223 Judge
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at *8.
218. Id.
219. Id. at *9.
220. Id. at *1 ("The asserted attorney-client privilege cannot extend to a public
relations consultant on the facts of this case.") (emphasis added).
221. Id. at *9; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 321, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("[T]here has been no showing that [communica-
tions between the public relations consultant and Martha Stewart] has a nexus suffi-
ciently close to the provision or receipt of legal advice.") (emphasis added).
222. Schroder, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *9.
223. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
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Cote found that "no requests for legal advice" were made in the
requested e-mails.224
The court in Schroder also relied on the Calvin Klein decision to
hold that the plaintiff has not shown that the public relations con-
sultant was "'performing functions materially different from those
that any ordinary public relations advisor would perform.- 225
While the holding has several interpretations, it is clear that plain-
tiffs would have to articulate specifically when and how the public
relations consultant aided the lawyer in the rendition of legal ser-
vices to make the communications privileged.
IV. PUBLIC RELATIONS EXPERT: A PRIVILEGED PERSON IN
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
The cases addressed in the previous section raise significant
questions with respect to the scope of the attorney-client privilege
and how it applies to public relations experts. When, if ever, is
communicating with the media a legal service as opposed to a busi-
ness service? As the previous section indicated, not everything
that a lawyer does is a legal service for the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege. Although lawyers are constitutionally allowed to
communicate with the media on behalf of their clients within the
scope of the ethical rule, that does not necessarily mean that a law-
yer's communications with the media are always or perhaps ever a
legal service. It is conceivable that bolstering a client's reputation,
as in Gentile, does not advance the litigation but serves an auxiliary
purpose. If the lawyer is lobbying for the client, is that a legal ser-
vice? Perhaps communication with the media is more legitimately
viewed in certain kinds of cases, for example, in high profile crimi-
nal cases. The cases discussed in the previous sections lead to the
conclusion that, at least in those circumstances, talking to the me-
dia could be an aspect of the legal representation for the purposes
of attorney-client privilege.
Assuming that talking to the media constitutes legitimate legal
services, what legitimate, important roles might the public relations
expert play in assisting the lawyer, and what confidential communi-
cations are necessary to enable the expert to perform those roles?
The public relations expert's role can be seen from two perspec-
tives. First, the public relations expert might give advice to the
lawyer about how the lawyer should communicate with the media.
224. Schroder, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14586, at *6.
225. Id. at *8 (quoting Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, 55(S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
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In carrying out this function, the issue is whether the public rela-
tions expert needs to talk to the client or learn otherwise privileged
information, or can the public relations expert give the advice in
the abstract?
A second view of the public relations expert's role is that of the
lawyer's "mouthpiece"-an agent who engages with the media on
the lawyer's behalf. This also raises the question of whether such a
function is important enough. Why can the lawyer not communi-
cate directly with the media? Furthermore, the "mouthpiece role"
creates ambiguities. When is the public relations expert acting as
the lawyer's mouthpiece, which, under Kovel, may be legitimate,
and when is the public relations expert acting as a client's "mouth-
piece," which presumably is not proper for the purposes of attor-
ney-client privilege? The following discussion addresses these
questions, and offers recommendations to attorneys so they can en-
sure that their communications with the public relations expert are
privileged.
A. When is Lawyer Communication with the Media a
Legitimate Legal Service?
Several of the cases discussed in Part III suggest that in certain
circumstances, and especially in criminal cases, a lawyer's interac-
tion with the media constitutes a legitimate legal service. Our soci-
ety views criminal charges with greater seriousness than civil
offenses, and thus imposes greater punishments. Although in both
civil and criminal contexts the client's reputation can become sul-
lied, it is only in the criminal context that one stands the chance of
a prison sentence and the creation of a criminal record. The Sixth
Amendment speaks to the gravity of a criminal charge by guaran-
teeing the right to a fair trial to a criminal defendant. Yet, as the
media delivers sensational news reports and as public outrage
grows about a particular case, the prosecutors may be influenced to
indict or bring more severe charges since they carefully consider
public opinion polls in making charging decisions.226 In fact,
prosecutorial discretion has been called a lawless area and ulti-
mately a political choice.227
226. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 330; Cohen & Gershman,
supra note 140, at 22.
227. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727-31(1998) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that a prosecutor has vast power and immense discretion with respect
to criminal investigations, and that the primary check against abuse of this
prosecutorial discretion is political).
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It is these situations where the lawyer would be carrying out her
fundamental duties to her client by interacting with the media to
keep a prosecutor from indicting or from overreacting to public
opinion by bringing excessive charges. Under these conditions, as
the Martha Stewart court suggests, if a lawyer interacts with the
media to strategically aim a message at those officials whose
charges are of great consequences to the type of punishment a cli-
ent could receive and whose actions often determine a client's free-
dom, it should be considered a legitimate legal service. In fact, it is
the lawyer's duty to seek to avoid or narrow charges, zealously
seek acquittal or vindication, and advise the client of the legal risks
of speaking publicly. The plurality in the Supreme Court's decision
in Gentile recognized and indirectly encouraged lawyers to pursue
"lawful strategies to obtain dismissal of an indictment or ...of
charges." '228 Thus, under circumstances where heavy negative news
coverage threatens to taint the judicial process by adversely influ-
encing the prosecutors, a lawyer's communication with the media is
less likely to be a business service. Since prosecutors are respon-
sive to public opinion, lawyers should have the opportunity to bal-
ance out the news coverage. Clients should not have to endure
higher charges simply because the prosecutors want the public to
know that they are tough on crime.
Although prosecutors are influenced by public opinion, they too
play a role in setting the public discourse with the information that
they reveal to the public via the media. In this complex prosecu-
tor-media interaction, even legitimate information linked to a cli-
ent can project guilt. Such coverage has the possibility of tainting
the jury pool. It is unlikely, however, that a lawyer's actions to
influence the jury pool will be ethical under the current rules of
professional responsibility. The Justices in Gentile explicitly reiter-
ated this view when they noted that even if the lawyer has constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech, she still has ethical obligations
that she swore to uphold.229 Those obligations include following
the precepts of Model Rule 3.6, which, even with its "fair reply"
provision, is still highly restrictive of attorney interaction with the
media.
Influencing the jury pool has never been an acceptable goal, and
that is, in fact, the reason why lawyers were historically highly re-
stricted from interacting with the media. The Gentile Court em-
228. Gentile v. State Bar, 501 U.S. 1030, 1043 (1991).
229. See id. at 1072-73 (stating that the speech of those participating before a court
can be restricted).
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phasized that the outcome of a criminal trial is to be decided by
impartial jurors based on the evidence presented at trial, and thus
any extra judicial statements by lawyers supplying their version of
the facts is seen as a threat to the fair process. 230 It is worth noting
that in none of the three cases evaluated in the previous section did
the parties claiming protection of the privilege express their motive
for hiring a public relations expert as to aid them in influencing the
jury pool. While influencing the jury pool may not be ethical con-
duct, a lawyer should nonetheless be allowed to communicate with
the media when she reasonably believes that prejudicial publicity
will encourage prosecutors to indict or bring excessive charges.
B. Are Public Relations Experts Important Enough?
As the above discussion indicates, communicating with the me-
dia to counteract damaging news coverage that threatens to under-
mine a client's right to a fair process could be an essential part of a
lawyer's legal services. Yet, many attorneys are not public rela-
tions experts since they are taught how to litigate and negotiate in
a legal setting, not how to advocate on a client's behalf in a public
forum.231 There have been many reported instances where a law-
yer, inexperienced in dealing with the media but feeling that she
must respond to the harmful coverage, injured her client's case by
speaking out. 232 Therefore, many attorneys, as the court in the
Martha Stewart grand jury trial acknowledged, may need to turn to
a public relations expert because they realize that the experts are
more than mere conveniences, they are an integral part of the legal
effort.233
i) Public Relations Experts as Advisors
Public relations experts help the lawyer deal with the morass of
public relations engagement. They provide skilled advice regard-
ing possible statements to the various forms of media ranging from
"no comment" to detailed factual presentations, and how such
statements may be reported. 34 They advise the attorney on
whether the client should speak to the media at all, and if so,
230. Id. at 1070.
231. See generally Moses, supra note 11 (explaining that there are clients who have
won in the courtroom, but have nevertheless been beaten in the media).
232. See Semel & Sevilla, supra note 2, at 64.
233. John Siegal & Jeremy R. Feinberg, Keeping a Client's Privilege Intact: Ruling
Sets Forth When Media Consultants' Presence Can be Risky, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 15, 2003,
at S3.
234. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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whether to do it personally or through representatives. 23 5 Public
relations experts also advise the attorney as to how best to aim her
message at prosecutors and law enforcement agencies, whether to
respond to specific allegations, and advise the attorney on when is
the most appropriate time to communicate with the media.
The advice of a public relations expert is significant when an at-
torney is attempting to avoid charges or avoid excessive charges
being brought against her client. If the lawyer is not sufficiently
skilled and knowledgeable in the field of media relations, then it is
her duty to seek the assistance of an expert that can help her get
acquainted with the subject area and be able to navigate through it
for her client's legal benefit. After all, while communicating with
the media may seem simple, in reality the field is far more com-
plex. Most attorneys do not deal with the media on a daily basis,
and when a case calls for public engagement, they need the assis-
tance of public relations experts to advise them on how to interact
so that words are not taken out of context. The Kovel decision
envisions that a lawyer may seek outside help when she needs as-
sistance in a subject area in which she is not an expert in order to
advance her client's case. Lawyers should be able to retain public
relations experts to help deal with important aspects of the litiga-
tion, knowing that communications with the expert are protected.
There is simply no practical way for meaningful discussions to oc-
cur if the lawyer is unable to inform the public relations expert of
nonpublic facts, as well as the lawyer's defense strategies and
tactics.236
ii) Public Relations Experts Talking to the Client
While the Kovel court found protectable situations where the cli-
ent spoke directly to the translator without the attorney's presence,
whether the translator was provided by the attorney or by the cli-
ent, there may be a difference as to a public relations expert. As
previously noted, public relations experts, unlike engineers and fo-
rensic experts, always run the risk of appearing to have provided
business services for the client because their job could be useful to
the client outside the legal representation. Also, intuitively, com-
municating with the media is not nearly as complicated or arcane
as organic chemistry or fingerprint analysis. Indeed, the Calvin
Klein court indicated that public relations experts do not provide
235. Id.
236. Id.
1476
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND PRIVILEGE
the "translator" function served by the accountant in Kovel.237
Likewise, the court in Schroder concluded that the public relations
expert provided standard public relations services, via Schroder's
attorney.238 Therefore, unless steps are taken to lessen the appear-
ance that a public relations expert is being hired for the client's
business purposes, it is difficult for judges to determine whether
there was a legitimate legal purpose in the relationship. It is not
hard to see how an attorney can serve as a conduit for a client's
business purposes-the client asks the lawyer to hire a public rela-
tions expert and, just as in the tobacco cases, the presence of the
lawyer is supposed to immunize the communications from an ad-
versary's attack.
The cases discussed in Part III demonstrate that courts are not in
agreement as to whether the attorney-client privilege would extend
if a client interacted directly with the public relations expert. The
court in Martha Stewart's grand jury trial, for example, did not see
it as problematic if the client talked directly to the public relations
consultants, without the presence of attorneys, as long as the com-
munications were aimed at giving or obtaining legal advice.239 Yet,
given the tone of the Calvin Klein and the Schroder decisions, and
the explicitly narrow view of the privilege adopted by both courts,
it is reasonable to infer that they are likely to see client-public rela-
tions expert communication as evidence of business service.
iii) Public Relations Expert as the Lawyer's Mouthpiece
A second possible role of a public relations expert is to be the
attorney's agent and in this capacity talk to the media on the law-
yer's behalf. The Kovel decision envisions the possibility that law-
yers may need agents to perform various tasks.24 ° One of the
reasons why a lawyer may decide to have the public relations ex-
pert speak on her behalf is if, for example, she decides to hold a
press conference and take questions from reporters, she may feel
that a public relations expert may be better able to handle the
questions. On the other hand, the decision may simply be one of
delegation of duties, with the paralegals and law school associates
doing the research, while the public relations expert handles the
237. Calving Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53, at 54-55 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
238. Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14586, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003).
239. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
240. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921 (2nd Cir. 1961).
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media. But, having the public relations expert talk to the media
creates ambiguities that are difficult to defend to a scrutinizing
court.
The concern is the same-whether the public relations consult-
ant is the lawyer's or the client's "mouthpiece," and how to tell the
difference. The suspicion that the public relations expert is provid-
ing business services for the client is heightened in circumstances
where the public relations expert speaks on a lawyer's behalf. Fur-
thermore, a nafve court may be unconvinced that a lawyer needs a
public relations expert to communicate with the media because
public speaking appears to be so facile. As the court in Calvin
Klein pointed out, when a public relations expert interacts with the
media they are "simply providing ordinary public relations ad-
"1241 dvice, which does not qualify for the protection under the privi-lege doctrine.
C. Lawyers and Public Relations Experts-Maintaining
the Privilege
In representing high profile clients whose chances of obtaining a
fair trial could be adversely influenced by heavy negative media
coverage, an attorney requiring the aid of a public relations expert
should not be dissuaded from relying on their knowledge and skills
simply because there is disagreement among courts as to whether
and under what circumstances the privilege attaches. After all,
none of the courts discussed have categorically stated that the priv-
ilege may never attach-they just have not been convinced given
the facts in particular cases. When communications between a
public relations expert and an attorney are challenged, the defend-
ing party will have to demonstrate to the judge the steps taken to
ensure that the communications were privileged and that the attor-
ney required the assistance and advice of a public relations expert
for the purposes of the representation. The judge will probably
conduct an in camera review and likely evaluate and determine
whether the privilege attaches based on the "totality of the circum-
stances," i.e., whether on the whole there was sufficient legal rea-
son to justify extending the attorney-client privilege to include a
public relations expert. In determining the issue, the judge will
have to evaluate whether talking to the media was a legitimate le-
gal service in the given circumstances. She will also have to judge
whether the public relations expert was a necessary agent in ad-
241. Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 54-55.
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vancing the litigation forward or was instead providing business
services to the client.
The following factors are conclusions inferred from the cases
previously discussed that may help attorneys ensure that their com-
munications are privileged. The factors are not meant to be ap-
plied mechanically but demonstrating most, if not all of the facts,
make the decision to rely on a public relations expert easier to de-
fend and may lessen the likelihood that the public relations expert
will be viewed as an outside third-party who destroys the privilege.
First, in order to demonstrate that the media engagement was a
necessary legal service the lawyer must make a showing that heavy
negative publicity had the possibility of undermining her client's
chances of obtaining a fair trial by influencing the prosecutor to
indict or bring heavier charges. This can be done with pre-indict-
ment evidence from various media outlets which the attorney rea-
sonably believes tends to incite public outrage and therefore is
likely to effect the prosecutor's indictment decision. Demonstrat-
ing this is the necessary first step because it removes the specter of
doubt that the party claiming the protection of the privilege initi-
ated the engagement with the media prior to any negative publicity
about the client, which could create doubt as to whether such en-
gagement was indeed a legal service necessary for the representa-
tion. As the Calvin Klein court concluded, such preemptive
engagement will not be protected by the privilege.242
Second, the attorney must hire the public relations expert.
243
Hiring by itself, however, as the Calvin Klein and the Schroder
cases indicated, will not privilege the information since it does not
entirely remove the possibility that the public relations expert is
performing a business service for the client via the attorney.24 4 It is
also not the conclusion entirely based on Kovel because that deci-
sion envisioned that a client could bring his own translator.245 Fur-
242. Id. at 55.
243. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331 ("[The] Target would not
have enjoyed any privilege for her own communications with Firm if she had hired the
firm directly.").
244. See Haugh v. Schroder Inv. Mgmt. N. Am., 02 Civ. 7955, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14586, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2003) (finding that the public relations firm
merely provided standard public relations services for the plaintiff); Calvin Klein, 198
F.R.D. at 54 ("None of these vague and largely rhetorical contentions ... is particu-
larly helpful to assessing the purpose of the documents here in issue, many of which
appear on their face to be routine suggestions from a public relations firm as to how
to put the 'spin' most favorable to CKI on successive developments in the ongoing
litigation.").
245. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
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thermore, realistically the client is still paying for the expert,
whether the lawyer hires him or not because the cost will inevitably
be incorporated into the client's bill. Nevertheless, the difficulty of
drawing a line between legitimate legal service and business service
where public relations experts are concerned drives towards the
conclusion that the lawyer should do the hiring. The necessity for
such seemingly arbitrary line drawing, as Judge Kaplan noted, is
24necessary. 46 Judge Kaplan applied Kovel's rationale to public rela-
tions firms: drawing of seemingly arbitrary lines is "the inevitable
consequence of having to reconcile the absence of privilege for ac-
countants and the effective operation of the privilege of a client
and a lawyer under conditions where the lawyer needs outside
help. 247
Third, although the Kovel decision suggests that a client should
be able to communicate directly with an attorney's agent, with or
without the attorney's presence and whether or not the attorney
hired the agent, for the purposes of ensuring the attachment of the
privilege, it is best that the public relations expert only interact
with the attorney. 48 When only the lawyer communicates with the
public relations expert, the situation is more consistent with the
entire purpose for hiring the public relations expert-to assist the
lawyer in advancing the representation of her client. Also, as men-
tioned earlier, it is difficult for judges to determine whether there
was a legitimate legal purpose in the relationship or whether it was
a business service for a client, discussing ways to bolster the client's
reputation. If and when a client interacts directly with the public
relations expert, it adds to the possibility that it was a business ser-
vice because, presumably, any information that a public relations
expert needs in order to conduct her job can be obtained from the
attorney.
The fourth consideration that lawyers wishing to engage the ex-
pertise of a public relations expert should consider is interacting
directly with the media. As with the previous point, having the
public relations expert contact members of the media directly
could be seen as "ordinary public relations advice," i.e., business
service to the client. The Calvin Klein court was clear that such
services as "reviewing press coverage, making calls to various me-
dia to comment on developments in the litigation," and "finding
246. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
247. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
248. See id. at 921-22.
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friendly reporters" does not constitute legal services.249 Legal ser-
vices, as suggested by the court in Martha Stewart's grand jury
case, is having the public relations expert advise the lawyer on
which media outlets to use, when and how best to conduct the com-
munications, and whether the client should speak directly to the
media.2 ° The latter elements are more directly related to a law-
yer's duty to avoid charges being brought or to ensure that unnec-
essary excessive charges are not brought.
In addition to the fundamental aspect of the attorney-client priv-
ilege-that communications be confidential-the factors men-
tioned above return full circle to what the Kovel court expressed
was the crucial aspect of the privilege. "What is vital to the privi-
lege is that the communication be made in confidence for the pur-
pose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer. 251
CONCLUSION
Advocating in the court of public opinion is the defining charac-
teristic of some attorneys in recent times. The traditional role of an
attorney focusing only on the courtroom is outdated. In this era of
the Internet and twenty-four-hour cable news channels, advocating
in the public forum to avoid charges brought or reduce their sever-
ity, is more and more recognized as a necessity rather than a
choice. Failing to recognize this impinges upon clients' rights, ham-
pers the advancement of the legal profession, and acts in contradic-
tion to the explicit goals of the profession. If we embrace media
and protect it with broad First Amendment protections, we must
accept that lawyers need to protect their clients' right to a fair judi-
cial process. Public relations firms are often part of the modern
age response to this modern age problem. For our system of adju-
dication to be fair and just, if we protect the media's right to in-
flame the public opinion, to which prosecutors are highly attentive,
then we must permit attorneys to engage the media through the
assistance of public relations experts.
249. Calvin Klein, 198 F.R.D. at 54-55.
250. See In re Grand Jury Supboena, 265 F. Supp. at 330-31.
251. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.
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Aslax:
